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Few subjects in the early constitutional history of any people
possess a more enduring interest or have occupied a larger share
of the historian's attention than that of status. The pictures of
early England preserved by the Domesday Book and the Chroni-
clers exhibit personal classifications whose manifold distinctions
are as difficult of accurate discernment as are the well-nigh infi-
nite gradations of those fetters holding land and population in a
correlated bondage: servus, colibertus, cotarius, villanus," soche-
mannus, liber homo, gesith, thegn, unroll before the gaze like fold-
ing ridges in a landscape too distant for the observer to grasp
aught save the most general outline. When the United States, how-
ever began its independent career, public law recognized amid the
native population joined to form a new govenrment two chief classes
only-the slave and the free; members of the latter class being
termed in the treaty of peace 1 with Great Britain, in the Articles of
Confederation, and in the Constitution, citizens, while the slave ap-
pears in this last named instrument as an "other person"--a phrase
due not alone to a wish that our organic law shall be lacking in at
least the term slave, but also to broad-minded statesmanship of
constitution-framers, largely from the South, who confidently hoped
to see within their own day personal slavery disappear and with it
the odium of political class-distinction. Yet the subsequent course
of history not only failed to realize so humane a forecast but was
destined to show a determined tendency of quite another aspect.
Far from simplifying the question of constitutional status this ten-
dency, which made itself felt within less than.a score of years after
the new government had begun, aimed to introduce a third class in-
to the political family. Manumission, it was contended, might,
indeed, give freedom to the bondman, yet the stain of his former
condition must be considered ineffaceable-to citizen status neither
the freedman nor his descendants could ever attain. Touching
x. Of the treaty, Bancroft says with characteristic directness: "So the
instrument, which already contained a confession that the United States were
not formed into one nation, made known that in this confederacy man could
be held as a chattel; but, as interpreted alike in America and England, it
included free negroes among their citizens." (History of the United States)
(last revision). Vol. I, p. s79.)
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no doctrine -of any description did public sentiment more sharply
divide than upon this one whose far reaching consequences were
readily apprehended. In the following pages an effort will
be made to trace the development, in judicial opinion, of this new
position; in doing this we shall necessarily seek to test the grounds
upon which court decisions denying citizenship to free Africans
were based; and, since these grounds consisted mainly of an appeal
to supposed analogies in history, the Constitution 2 itself nowhere
defining, or giving Congress the power to define, citizenship, we
shall further undertake to glance briefly at the condition assigned
to emancipated slaves in Roman law, whose example, in this respect,
came frequently before the judges.
Who are the citizens spoken -of in the Constitution, and termed
in the preamble to that instrument "the people of the United
States ?" Plainly, on this point there is no controversy-
they were those persons belonging to any class then recognized
in a state of the Union or by Congress of the Confederation as an
integral element in the government 3 ; no subsequent development of
of opinion can affect the matter. Nor have records of the time
2. The Constitution simply provides, touching citizenship, that citizens of
each state must be regarded as citizens in every other state; Congress pre-
scribes a rule, uniform in application, for the Iremoval of disabilities of alien-
age;" emancipation, however, whereby a state receives into its citizen-ranks
(and thus into those of the Union) a native through adoption, is, constitution-
ally, widely removed from naturalization. ", Emancipation," said Gaston, J.,
in State v. Manuel (4 Dev. and Battle (N. C.), 20, 25) "is the removal
of the incapacity of slavery," and "depends wholly on the internal regula-
tions of the state;" whereas the framing of a rule of naturalization "be-
longs to the government of the United States. It would be a dangerous
mistake to confound them." This, however, is precisely the mistake made by
the Supreme Court in Dred Scott's case; and we may add that the opinion
then given rests upon the inference drawn from the various civil and political
restrictions laid upon freed slaves and showing, as the court thought, that
they were not citizens. Had the judges examined the facts, showing that
freedmen were citizens, the decision must have been otherwise. This is clearly
shown by Judge Appleton in his opinion submitted to the senate of Maine,
pursuant to the senate's request of March 26, 1857 (44 Maine, 521, 575).
3. "It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons
who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognized as citizens
in the several states, became also citizens of this new political body; but none
other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no
one else... .. It became necessary, therefore, to determine who were citi-
zens of the several states when the Constitution was adopted. . . . We
must inquire who, at the time, were recognized as the people or citizens of a
state," etc. (Opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
19 Howard, 393, 406-407.)
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left us in any doubt touching what persons were thus recoghized.
It is evident, nevertheless, that the presence of the native Indian,
together with the enslaved and the freed African, gave rise at the
very outset to necessity of definition. The Indian, segregated in
his tribe and not responsible for the support of government, was
easily laid aside as one "not paying taxes ;" how should it be with
the slave? Could he be reckoned among the population as an in-
habitant, or should he be accounted merchandise? Again, fiee men
of European descent, excluding aliens, were, of course, white citi-
zens; were there other free men who, being of African descent and
not white, were, nevertheless, citizens? To clearly appreciate the
significance of the attitude assumed toward these questions by the
Continental Congress it becomes necessary to recall the use made
at the period under consideration of the term "inhabitant." To
those first summoned to organize revolutionary governments exact
nomenclature was a matter of quite secondary importance; within
a colony's limits all inhabitants4 adhering to the proposed new
order were promptly claimed as owing allegience; subjects no long-
er acknowledged a royal master, while citizens had scarcely as
yet emerged into the light of public law. Thus it was that, follow-
ing the new method of thought, the committee appointed by. the
Continental Congress to prepare articles of union, reported (July
12, 1776) 5 an article touching money requisitions in these words:
"all charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred
for the common defense, or general welfarej and allowed by the
United States assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treas-
ury which shall be supplied by the several colonies in proportion to
the number of inhabitants of every age, sex, and quality, except
Indians not paying taxes, in each colony, a true account of which,
distinguishing the white inhabitants, shall be triennially taken and
4. This subject was fully reviewed in the leading cases of McIl'aine v.
Coxe's Lessee) 2 Cranch, 280 and 4 Cranch, 209), a New Jersey case; and
Ingles vi. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, a case from 'New York,
New York (July x6, 1776) declared "all persons" within its borders "desiring
protection from the laws" to be "members of the state;" New Jersey passed
a similar act in the following October; the first constitutions of these states
(1776 and 1777) recognized all inhabitants, but when forming new instruments
(in 1821 and 1844, respectively) these states designated their members as
citizens.
5. The formation of the Articles of Union is narrated not only in the Jburnals
of Congress, but in the addition to Volume I of the secret journals termed
- History of the Confederation;" the more important features are reproduced
by Elliott in his edition of the "Journal of the Federal Convention" (Vol. I of
the "Debates").
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transmitted to the assembly of the United States." On July 31St
it was moved to restrict the basis of levy to "white inhabitants"
on the ground that, slaves being property only and not state-
members, the proposed plan would tax large slaveholding communi-
ties on a double basis of wealth and population. 6 But the motion
was unsuccessful, and the negro slave was suffered to remain as
an element in the population, though, on October 14, 1777, land
becamd the basis of requisitions in place of persons.7 With mili-
tary levies, on the other hand the case stood far otherwise; for
here those to be enlisted must, of course, come chiefly from classes
who had not known slavery. A&ordingly it was agreed that
requisitions for troops be laid "in proportion to the number of white
inhabitants ;" though from North Carolina, Virginia, and more than
one Northern state, black regiments, recruited of both slave and
free -elements, bore a brave part, nor did the Virginia legislature
hesitate to acknowledge the value of their services. 8
In the- seventh of the articles of union submitted to Congress
July 12, 1776, a general freedom of intercourse among the United
Colonies was attempted to be secured: "the inhabitants of each
colony," ran the provision, "shall enjoy all the rights, liberties,
privileges, immunities and advantages in trade, navigation, and com-
merce in any other colony, and in going to and from the same, from
and to any part of the world, which the natives of such colony en-
joy." 9  Bearing in mind the use made by individual colonies of
the term "inhabitant," it is clear that Congress here attempted to
place all thus designated by any state as forming part of its people
(excluding, of course, the slaves) in as favorable a case in every
other state as the most favored (free) native of the latter-both
"native" and "inhabitant" being practically the equivalent of state-
member. In its final form (as approved November 13, 1777) this
clause provides that the free inhabitants of each of these states,
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several states ;" the word free is here prefixed to "inhabitants,"
while "natives" now appear as "free citizens." For the change in
6. Jefferson's "Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress" (i Elliott,
70-71), and in "The Writingsof ThomasJefferson" (Washington, i9o3, Vol. 1,
36, e. sg.)
7. Secret Journal of Congress, Vol. I, 3o9. Six years later the basis was
changed to population as noticed infra.
8. Act of 1783 (cited by Judge Appleton, 44 Maine, 534).
9. Secret Journals of Congress. Addition to Vol. I "History of the Con-
federation."
EMANCIPATION AND CITIZENSHIP.
phraseology a reason is easily found in the evident possibility that
under the terms "inhabitant" and "native" slaves might be held
to be comprised; hence the qualified expression "free inhabitants,"
narrowing the privileged classes (as probably intended) to white
state-members together with Africans not in slavery. In this sense,
indeed we find the words employed by Dr. Rush, when address-
ing Congress August I, 1776, ini favor of voting in the federal
assembly on a basis of state-population: "the voting by the number
of free inhabitants," said Rush, "will have one excellent effect-
that of inducing the colonies to discourage slavery and to encourage
the increase of their free inhabitants," 10 these free inhabitants of
course, included freedmen. The term, however, was not happily
chosen in the Articles, since, as it might be construed to apply
also to aliens, these latter, as Madison complains (Federalist, No.
42), would be capable of being practically naturalized by any state
in every other part of the union. In the words "free citizens," how-
ever, we have, plainly, a reminiscence of the free members of an
English town corporation-the citizen clothed with privileges be-
longing to his local franchise. But in whatever manner we may con-
strue these phrases, a sure inter,.etation of the meaning assigned to
them in the thought of the Continental Congress is conveyed by the
notes given June 25, 1778, on the occasion of two motions made by
South Carolina's delegates to alter article IV so that it should read:
"the free white inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vaga-
bonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states
according to the law of such states respectively for the government
of their own free white inhabitants." These changes were simi-
lar to an amendment agreed to on February 26, 1778, by tle legis-
lature of Georgia, though not, apparently pressed on the attention
of Congress. The motions made by South Carolina were at once
rejected by the decisive vote of eight states against two with one
divided. Delegates from eight states, therefore, insisted that
their black citizen-inhabitants be equally received as citi-
zens throughout the Confederation, nor would thete delegates
suffer black citizens to be governed, in this regard, by laws enacted
for the regulation of white persons merely. Finally, April 18, 1783
(the war being now ended and funds to maintain the administration
being alone needed), Congress resolved that such charges be de-
frayed "by the several states in proportion to the whole number of
white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex and
1o. 1 Elliott, 77.
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condition, including those bound to servitude for a.term of years,
and three-fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the fore-
going description, except Indians not paying taxes, in each state." "
We have here, be it carefully noted: (a) white free citizens;
(b) "other free citizens" who, being -not white, were colored; (c)
"inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound
to servitude for a term of years"--by which we undemtand aliens
and apprentices; (d) "three-fifths of all other persons except In-
ians"-- by which reference is made to the enslaved class.
So Congress, in the end, deliberately classified the free native
of color as a citizen. And, following so unmistakable an interpre-
tation of public law touching status, authoritative utterances were
not lacking by the organs of state governments in clear confirma-
tion of doctrines announced by the central administration. Six
months later the legislature of Virginia, at its October session-
1783, repealed an act passed in 1779 touching citizenship, which
act had declared "all white persons born within the ter-
ritory of this commonwealth and all who have resided
therein two years next before the passing of this act,
and all who shall hereafter migrate into the same, other than alien
enemies . .. shall be deemed citizens of this Commonwealth .. .
and all others not being citizens of any of the United States of
America shall be deemed aliens." The new act provided that "all
free persons," etc., shall be citizens, thus bringing the definitive
legislative action of the state into line with the sense of the country
as announced by Congress in its general classification above no-
ted; 11 this was re-enacted in 1786; so. that when the national Con--
ii. These proceedings are set out in the Journals, Vol. 4, and in the
Secret Journals, Vol. I, addition, etc. Georgia's proposed amendment is pre-
served in Vol. 4 of the Journals at p. 283, and seems to have hitherto escaped
the attention it deserves. South Carolina's motion, and the classification of
1783 were noticed by M. Hemphill during the Missouri debate of December
1I, 1820 (Annals of x6th Cong., 2nd Sess. p. 60o), and were carefully analyzed
by Judge Appleton (44 Maine, 531-544) who conclusively shows the develop-
ment of these conceptions in the convention of 1787 and their presence in the
"new national Constitution; it is manifest, therefore," says he, "that free per-
sons of African descent, being native born, were regarded by those by whom
the Constitution was framed, as free citizens, as they had been during the
Revolution and under the Confederation;" cf. Mr. Justice Curtis, in Scott v.
Sandford, 19 How., at p. 575. In the text I have followed Judge Appleton's
summary. In no part of the country, .perhaps, were these doctrines more
quickly adopted than in North Carolina. where the right of suffrage (at that
period indissolubly connected in public thought with state-membership-as is
shown by the New Jersey constitution'of 1776 and that of New York of 1777)
was exercised by freed negroes from a very early period and until withdrawn
by the Constitution as amended in 1835; cf. the "Proceedings and Debates of
the North Carolina Convention," held at Raleigh, June 4, 1835.
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stitution was adopted no barrier lay between the free African and
citizenship in the State of Virginia where law and statecraft then
found a more assiduous following and had reached a higher level
than elsewhere within the Union.
Again, the freedman's position in New York will be clearly seen
in the following extract from the minutes of the Council of Revis-
ion at a meeting attended by Chancellor Livingston, Governor
Clinton, and Mr. Justice Hobart of the Supreme Court, March 21,
1785; a bill for the gradual abolition of slavery being laid before
the Council the following objections, reported by the Chancellor,
were adopted: 1 2
"i. Because the last clause of the bill enacts that no negro,
mulatto or mustee shall have a legal vote in any case whatsoever;
which implicatively excludes persons of this description from all
share in the legislature, and those offices in which a vote may be
necessary, as well as from the important privilege of electing those
by whom they are to be governed; the bill having in other instances
placed the children that shall be born of slaves in the rank of citi-
zens, agreeable both to the spirit and letter of the Constitution,
they are as such entitled to all privileges of citizens, nor can
they be deprived of these essential rights without shocking those
principles of equal liberty which every page in that Constitution
labors to enforce.
"2. Because it holds up a doctrine which is repugnant to the
principles on which the United States justify their separation from
Great Britain, and either enacts what is wrong or supposes that
those may rightfully be charged with the burdens of government
who have no representative share in imposing them.
"3. Because this class of franchised and discontented citizens,
who, at some future period, may be both numerous and wealthy,
may, under the direction of ambitious and factious leaders, become
dangerous to the state, and effect the ruin of a constitution whose
benefits they are not permitted to enjoy.
"4. Because the creation of an order of citizens who are to have
no legislative or representative share in the government, necessari-
12. Street's "New York Council of Revision," Minutes, etc., p. 265.
33. "Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of New Jersey Relative to
the Manumission of Negroes," by Joseph Bloomfield, President of the "New
Jersey Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery," and Attorney-General
of the state; published in accordance with a resolution of the society passed
September 2, 1793. The case cited in the text is that of State v. Probasco,
brought up from Morris County (the writer's native county), and reported by
Bloomfield at p. 3o.
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ly lays the foundation of an aristocracy of the most dangerous and
malignant kind, rendering power permanent and hereditary in the
hands of those persons who deduce their origin through white an-
cestors only . . .
"5. Because the last clause of the bill, being general, deprives
those, black, mulatto and mustee citizens who have heretofore been
entitled to a vote, of this essential privilege, and under the idea of
political expediency, without their having been charged with any
offense, disfranchises them in direct violation of the rules of jus-
tice against the letter and spirit of the Constitution and tends to sup-
port a doctrine which is inconsistent with the most obvious princi-
ples of government, that the legislature may arbitrarily dispose of
the dearest rights of their constituents."
The foregoing sentences, let us not forget, represent the delib-
erate opinion of two of the most eminent statesmen our country
has produced, and whose profound acquaintance with their own
Laws and government can be questioned by none.
Once more, in New Jersey, a family of negroes were brought
before the Supreme Court praying their freedom at May term
I79i, they having been duly enfranchised some years previously;
they were now claimed as slaves because they had afterwards sub-
mitted to a hiring out; the judges, ordering their release, directed
that they "be discharged as free citizens;" 18 while, in he court
minutes of 1794, it is recorded that "a negro man was admitted to
vote who had no legal residence, and his declaration that he had
been manumitted in another state was received as sufficient proof of
his being entitled to a vote." 14
Despite these firmly settled aspects of opinion, legislative, exec-
utive and judicial, a desire rapidly gained ground in some common-
wealths to banish from their territory the slave become through
emancipation a free man, as well as to exclude by a positive inhibi-
tion the crossing of their borders by any free persons of the Afri-
can race. But were any such persons endowed with the privileges
of an inter-state citizenship, how could they be excluded in view
of the constitutional guarantee that "the citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens -in the
several states?" That men of color were held to be actually citi-
zens in many parts of the Union was undeniable. The sole recourse
then for the advocates of the new doctrine lay in announcing that
whatever condition might be reached -by a freedman under local
state law or custom, it doubtless must be considered powerless to
r4. Coxe's New Jersey Reports, p. 245.
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give him a standing under the national Constitution, if, indeed, the
privileges secured to such a one by reason of his freedom in any
state could be justly denominated citizenship; and that it could be,
was, furthermore, flatly denied. We proceed to a brief review of
the decisions establishing these doctrines.
June 19, 1882,15 the Kentucky Court of Appeals dismissed a
suit for freedom brought by one Amy who claimed that she had
become a citizen of Pennsylvania under the Confederation by
the terms of the abolition act passed by that state in 178o provid-
ing that slaves not registered should he free; Amy had not been
Tegistered, and had, moreover, subsequently gone to Virginia whose
statute law during her residence permitted, as we have seen, free
persons of color to be citizens. Accordingly, it was contended on
behalf of Amy, though her counsel unfortunately omitted to cite
Virginia's statute or any other evidence that persons emancipated
were state citizens under the Confederation, that free entrance to
Kentucky and a right to sue in its courts belonged to her under the
national Constitution. Still the judges thought that since free
persons of color were the subjects of many local restrictions, and
since, also, Congress had only provided hitherto for the naturali-
zation of white persons, no one of color could, through manumis-
sion, become a citizen; moreover, since at Rome "citizens were the
highest class of subjects to whom the jus civitatis belonged and . .
the jus civitatis conferred upon those who were in possession of
it all rights and privileges civil, political, and religious," therefore
no one could "in the correct sense of the term be a citizen of the
state who is not entitled upon the terms prescribed by the insti-
tutions of the state to all the rights and privileges conferred by
those institutions upon the highest class of society." 16 This denial
of colored citizenship on the ground of the numerous civil restric-
tions imposed upon freedmen had been already elaborated at great
length during the course of the debate on Missouri's admis-
sion-December, 1820. It was there maintained that "the
term citizen could not with propriety be applied to any
one unless under these circumstances; that he should be pos-
sessed of all at least of the civil rights, if not of the political, of ev-
ery other person in the community under like circumstances, of
which he is not deprived for some cause personal to himself ...
IS. Amy v. Smith, x Littell's Kentucky Reports, 333.
x6. This point is ably developed by Mr. Robertson in his argument for
defendant (who prevailed) in the celebrated case of Lynch v. Clarhe (New
York, November, x844), z Sandf., Ch. 583, 626-630.
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with regard to the individuals of this class (the freedmen) the
Constitution of the United States *had no reference to them or their
rights real or supposed." 17 The fallacies involved in such a view,
however, were clearly shown by Mr. Eustis of Massachusetts in
his searching address December 12, I82O. "What rights," said he,
speaking of the freedmen, "do they continue to enjoy and exercise?
We answer, all the broad and essential rights of citizens-the right,
in common with the whites, to hold real and personal estate; the
right of trial by jury; the right to the writ of habeas corpus and, in
this government (Massachusetts), the elective franchise." Laying
out of view the right to vote, not an indispensable element of citi-
zenship, since property or other qualification may lawfully narrow
it, we find this definition of what fundamental privilege belongs to-
one as a citizen, long afterward endorsed by the Supreme Court
of the United States in a carefully considered and unanimous opin-
ion touching interstate citizen rights under Article IV of the nation-
al Constitution; 1 "The clause plainly and unmistakably secures
and protects the right of the citizen of one state to pass into any
other state of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful com-
merce, trade, or business, without molestation. To acquire personal
property; to take and hold-real estate; and to be exempt from any
higher taxes or excises than are imposed by the state upon its own
citizens."
The conceptions entertained by the majority of the Kentucky
court in Amy v. Smith 20 touching state citizenship were shown to
be erroneous by a dissenting member,--Mills, J.-whose opinion
correctly outlines the subject in its varied aspects; with the sup-
posed parallel found by the judges in the law of Rome we shall
deal later. In closing our brief notice of this important case we
should not overlook a formal opinion given by the attorney-general
of the United States-William Wirt-only a few months previous-
ly, 2 that in Virginia free persons of color are not citizens of the
United States within the intent and meaning of the acts relating
to the foreign and coasting trade; the learned and accomplished
attorney-general basel his view upon the civil restrictions already
noted; but he did not, however, explore our early constitutional his-
tory nor did he seek to produce the statute law of his own -state of
17. December 8, 182o, Annals i6th Congress, second session, pp. 545-550.
i8. Annals, Ibid. p. 636.
x9. Ward v. Maryland (December term, 1870), 12 Wallace, 418, 430.
20. 1 Littell ubisu5ra.
21. November 7, 1821 (Op. of the Att.-Gen. i, 5o6-5o7).
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Virginia which law, as the Virginia court of appeals showed in
its carefully considered opinion rendered in Barzizas v. Hopkins,22
in 1824, still persisted in defining citizenship by the terms of the
statutes we have already noted; it continued accordingly to be the
heritage of all free persons; so firmly, indeed, had the law touch-
ing this question been settled that when the "Chesapeake" incident
occurred in the waters of that state in 18o7, the President of the
United States, one of the most illustrious of all Virginians, de-
clared, when issuing his proclamation July 2, i8o7, touching the
seizure by the British ship "Leopard" of three Americans (two of
whom were negroes, that the outrage had been committed upon
"native citizens of the United States !" 23 Nor did Virginia hesi-
tate to order its militia to be in readiness for the defense of Ameri-
can honor insulted in the persons of these dusky citizens.
As evidencing, however, the fast-changing aspects of opinion
in high places which we are seeking to trace, we note in the next
place the celebrated decision made by the Supreme Court of the
United States at its February term 1825 in the case of the "Ante-
lope," 24 pronouncing the African slave trade not contrary to the
law of nations; this utterance, well termed by John Quincy Adams
the Court's "most awful decision," 2 5 was sought to be justified
through a dictum utterel by Lord Stowell in the case of Le Louis,
December 1S, i817; 28 but our judges, in thus adopting the atrocious
sentence of a single judge sitting in the English high court of ad-
miralty, failed to remark that the supreme tribunal in admiralty
appeals of the British kingdom had previously, on March 17,
18io, 27 speaking by Sir William Grant in the celebrated cause of
the Amdie, given its unanimous opinion that the -slave trade was
contrary to universal law and could support no rights under that
code! Sixteen years after the Antelope case, our Supreme Court
did, indeed, in the case of the Amistad, 28 pronounce a judgment,
grounded upon the unanswerable arguments of Mr. Roger S. Bal-
win and Mr. John Quincy Adams, which, in freeing a band of sto-
len Africans claimed to be Spanish slaves, virtually repelled the An-
telope doctrine.
22. 2 Randolph's Virginia Reports.
23. Messages of the Presidents, 4, 122. Cf. McMaster, "History American
People," 3, 255; 44 Maine, 554.
24. io Wheaton, 66; I Wh. 413. I2Wh. 546.
25. The Antelope Case, in J. Q. Adam's "Opuscula."
26. 2 Dodson (Admiralty), 210, 248.
27. r Acton (Admiralty), 240, 251.
28. 15 Peters, 5x8 (January term, 1841).
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The principles of decision announced in Amy's case, though
destined to prevail ultimately in more than one forum,
failed .to influence the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1834; here,
in the case of Fisher's negroes v. Dabbs,2 Catron C. J., while not-
ing the inferior condition in civil life of most freedmen, neverthe-
less justly characterized manumission carried out pursuant to law
as a proceeding strictly public in its nature and one through which
the community solemnly adopts a new citizen: "it is an act of sover-
eignty, just as much as naturalizing the foreign subject. The high-
est act of sovereignty the government can perform, is to adopt a
new member with all the privileges and duties of citizenship. To
permit an individual to do this at pleasure would be wholly inad-
missible. How or when the state assents to the contract of manu-
mission, whether before or after its execution, is beside the con-
tract," etc.
In sharp contrast with this exposition of Chief Justice Catron
of the Tennessee Supreme Court appears the charge delivered to a
Connecticut grand jury three years later, July 1837, by Daggett,
C. J. 30 who, reviewing at length the various disabilities and social
inferiority of free colored persons, declared that these were not
citizens and that, consequently, a Connecticut statute seeking to
exclude from instruction (within the borders of that common-
wealth) any persons of this class coming from other states, was
valid. In such a view the Chief Justice seems to have lacked the
sympathy of the remaining members of his court, 3 1 but he found
a contemporory supporter in Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsyl-
vania who, in the case of Hobbs v. Fogg,32 determined earlier in
the same year, announced, though without a trace of historical prec-
edent being adduced, the deliberate position that a freedman could
not vote as a Pennsylvania citizen because it was inconceivable that
he couldhave been regarded by the founders of that commonwealth
as a citizen in early days; thus assuming the very point sought to
be proved. The same year, too, witnessed the decision by the Su-
preme Court of the United States of the important case of the City
29. 14 Tennessee, 126.
3o. Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 340, 347. This was an indictment for
giving instruction to free negroes from another state (in contravention of an
act passed in the preceeding year) tried in Windham County, July. I834.
31. )32 Conn. 565 (Opinion of the Justices, delivered in 1865), where itwas
declared that the constitutional amendments 'f 1845 restricting suffrage to
white male citizens did not warrant a supposition that persons of color (ex-
cluded from voting) were not, then, in spite of this, citizens.
32. March term, 1837- 6 Watts, 553; this and other contemporary cases
are collected in 2 Kent, 258, note.
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of New York v. Miln; " the court, in sustaining a New York stat-
ute directing shipmasters bringing passengers from abroad to re-
port them, etc., gave no little comfort to the doctrine that a state
may regulate as it will the admission within its borders of all per-
sons deemed objectionable: "in our view," said counsel on the
part of New York, "the law in question is altogether a police regu-
lation, as much so as laws prohibiting entrance into a walled city
after dark; laws prohibiting masters from bringing convicts into
the state; or the laws prohibiting free negroes from being intro-
duced among -slaves."
The constitutional validity of these sentiments came directly
before the Supreme Court of Tennessee at its December term held
in the following year, and the principles laid down by Chief Jus-
tice Catron were now cast aside. 3, One Claiborne, a free negro,
being indicted for entering the state, claimed as a Kentucky citizen
to be protected by the national Constitution. 3 The attorney-general
of Tennessee, arguing in support of the exclusion law, summed
up with great ability the various positions we have noticed, adding
to them a characterization of the free negro as one to be const;tu-
tionally considered a mere "sojourner in the land," neither a mem-
ber of the commonwealth nor entitled to recognition by national
law; he being only "allowed, usually by tacit consent, sometimes by
legislative enactment, certain specific rights ;" nor was the law of
Rome it seems, more favorable, since in the standard lexicon of
Forcellini, the Roman, is defined: "civis homo liber, urbis aut op-
pidi incola, et eodem cum ceteris jure utens ;" thus at Rome citizens
were characterized, said he, "by an equality of civil rights-eodem
jure." 16 But this unfortunate failure to apprehend a brilliant defini-
tion ignores the familiar fact that the same law under which Roman
citizens lived was the jus civile which by no means gave equality of
civil right, though its privileges were for members alone of the
city-state.
Continuing his historical parallels applicable to the case, the at-
33. 9 Peters, 85; i Peters, 102, 112.
34. Mr. Justice Catron had retired in 1836; in 1837 he became a member
of the United States Supreme Court.
35. Tie State v. Claiborne, Meig's Tenn. R. p. 331 (Dec. 1838).
36. Forcellini, of course, means to define a Roman as one who, together
with the other citizens, was governed by the same system of law-jus civile.
The non equality of many citizens in public rights will be noted later.
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tornmey-general cites Pufendorf s1 and Vattel in their descriptions
of the classes composing a state's varied population in their day;
from these authors the doctrine is deduced that "undoubtedly, there
may be in a state a class of people with limited privileges and im-
37. Pufendorf, in the passage here referred to (De Jur. Nat. et. Gent. 7, 2,
-o) pictures his model community as a strictly patriarchal one: "Foeminis
autem,' pueris et servis, quorum voluntates jam sub voluntate patris familias
continebantur, non nisi consequenter quatenus et ipse communi civitatis protec-
tione, et quibusdam juribus eo nomine faciuntur," etc. Women, children, and
serfs or a serving class (slaves had disappeared from Europe in Pufendorf's day),
are thus without public recognition save as part of a family group. Nor does
the gifted author place the resident aliens (inxquiiini,.Aeregrini) in a better posi-
tion. As to Vattel we may mark his well-known passage on citizenship as a
household word with our statesmen; it was brought forward in the Missouri
debate (December 1s, 1820) and on many occasions, and his classification of
the people into citizens, inhabitants, perpetual inhabitants, was adopted as
correctly characterizing American conditions; "les habitants," says he, "jouis-
sent seulement des avantages que la loi on la coutume leur donne. Les
habitants perp~tuels sont ceux qui ont requ le droit d'habitation perpdtuel.
C'est une esp~ce de citoyens d'un ordre inf6rieur; ils sont li6s A la socidt6,s ans
participer A tous ses avantages" (Droit des Gens, 1, xix, § 213). That Vattel
here correctly describes the Swiss oligarchical systems most familiar to him
none will gainsay. To comprehend his term "habitant perp6tuel" we must
call to mind his long residence at Bern as representative of Saxony. Here,
until the Revolutionary changes toward the end of the eighteenth century,
there reigned an oligarchy of the most formidable type: "Dorf und Stadt und
Staat," says Schuler (, die Thaten u. Sitten der Eidgenossen, ein Handbuch
der Schweizergeschichte," Zurich, X847), speaking of Swiss local governments,
"betrachteten Regierung und Volk als erweiterte Haushaltungen mit ihrem,
erbgut das zu wahren ,und zu mehren sei." Such a patriarchal conception,
held specially true in the case of Bern; of its people Schuler says (vol. 4, pt. i,
455) "die Einwohner der Hauptstadt theilten sich in regimentsfiihiger Gesch-
lechter (families eligible to office) ewige Einwohner (perpetual inhabitants) mit
einem Biirgerrecht dem nur die Regimentsffihigkeit versagt ward, und Einsat-
zenvonUnterthanenund Fremden." The perpetual inhabitant, then, was truly
a citizen "in the sense of the constitution, merely lacking eligibility to
public office which the ancient oligarchical families treasured as jealously as the
Athenian of Pericles' day; beside these perpetual citizens dwelled the subjects
(Unterthanen) and foreigners (Fremden); but in neither of these latter classes
can we place a slave adopted by the people through manumission, and Bern,
-besides, had neither freedmen nor slaves! In no event, however, could such
a parallel hold true, for even in medieval Europe Bodin (Six Livres de la
R6publique, Paris, 3d ed., 1578, ch. vi, p. 5) assures us (speaking of the
native bondman): "l'un est citoyen si tost qu'il est affranchi et suit rorigine
*de son seigneur." For, a true reflection of the spirit seeking through prepos-
terous historical analogies to exclude freedmen from rising in the body
politic we must revert to the England of Henry Eighth: " the fourth sort or
classe amongst us," says Sir Thomas Smith(deRepub. Anglorum, ch. 34), "is
of those which the old Romans called 'capite sensu proletarii or operarii,'day laborer, poot nnusbadmen; yea, merchants or retailers which have no f ee
land, copy-holders, and all artificers, as tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, brick-
makers, bricklayers, masons, etc. These have no voice nor authoritie in our
commonwealth, and no account ismade of them but only to be ruled and not
to rule others," etc. (p. fof 640). Let descendants of thoseJamestown and Plymouth colonists who migrated from these and 
similar con-
.ditions say whether this picture was ever appropriate 
to the New World!
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inunities, who may still be called 'citizens,' but it is not in this sense
that the word is used in our Constitution;" and we are referred
to Niebuhr, and to Potter's Greek Antiquities in order that we may
learn how hardly the non-citizen fared at Rome and Athens. This
conclusion of the attorney-general was adopted by the judges and
may be said to mark the culmination of a judicial position which
was destined nearly twenty years later to receive approbation at
the hands of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Dred Scott v. Sandford, where Scott's suit for freedom was repelled
on the ground that on the face of the pleadings he could not be
considered a citizen of the State of Missouri in the sense in which
the Constitution of the United States regards a state-member and
confers upon him interstate privileges and immunities, one of
which privileges is that of suing in a. court of the Union. The con-
curring opinions delivered in the same case, S too., affirm the rec-
ognition of African slavery in European public law which warrant-
38. io Howard, at p. 495: "The relation of domestic slavery is recognized
in the law of nations . . . the public law of Europe formerly permitted a
master to reclaim his\bondsman, within a limited period, wherever he could
find him, and one of the capitularies of Charlemagne," etc. But Charlemagne's
regulations were valid only throughout his empire, however extensive, and the
truth as to European public law is not in accord with that here indicated:
- si servus regionem nostrarum ac plurium gentium aliarum fines intravent
etiam invito domino possit confestim ad libertatem proclamare," says John
Voet (Ad. Pandect, 1, 5, 3); and, though the United States government endeav-
ored in the case of slave-ships, such as the "Comet" and "Enterprise," to main-
tain a different doctrine underMr. Calhoun's tutelage, every attempt of the kind
failed; even Spain agreed only to allow reclamation of fugitive slaves from
the Floridas as matter of grace, not international right, and the English Court
of King's Bench held the same position in Forbes v. Coohrane (2 Barn.
and Cres., 448)-Mich. term, 1824 -iust prior to our own Antelope decision;
cf. Congress Secret Journals, 4,442, where the Florida correspondence is given.
Our sole claim on Great Britain for slaves lost in the Revolution arose under
treaty (Jay's Report, in Secret Journals of Congress, 4. 217 seg.). Slavery, as
between different governments was, even in the Dark Ages, "an outlaw," as
Mr. Seward declared, "under the law of nations" (speech in the Senate, April
9, 1856, no treaty for the rendition of a slave had been made since the days of
a barbarian king of Russia in the year 902, until the United States of Amer-
ica endeavored to secure the return of escaped bondmen to whose services no
claim could be sustained under public law (cf. Mr. Seward's speech in the
United States Senate March 8, z85o, and that of Mr. Sumner, August 26,
x852). This fundamental principle was frankly recognized in North Carolina"
debate on the new national Constitution, January 17, 1788; said Gen. C. C.
Pinckney, at the close of his notable address, referring to the fugitive
slave clause, "we have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever
part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before."
(Elliott's "Debates," Vol. IV, p. 236).
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ed, it is averred, the return to his lord of an escaped bondman;
and, furthermore, by way of emphasizing the freedmen's position in a
state as one resting on grace rather than on right, we are told, as
a grave conclusion from well-proved facts of history, that never
before Justinian's bounty raised manumitted bondmen to burgess
rank could the slave through merely gaining freedom hope to
become a citizen of Rome. 39 Here the case against the black man
may fairly be considered closed: denied all opportunity to contest
his freedom in a court of the United States and rejected in local
tribunals as not being a citizen under the national Constitution;
told that his race might, in full agreement with the law governing
international action among enlightened men, be delivered over to
rapine and eternal bondage through the permitted success of the
slave-hunting bandit-to the African it was plain that jurispru-
dence had exchanged its birthright for a bias merely political and
careless of things- fundamental. From so dark a picture whose reali-
zation would have resulted in creating an ever-increasing class des-
titute of civil hope, we turn to the more cheerful teach-
ing of Roman law, the wisdom and clemency of which, un-
deterred by the severity of world-custom in the days
when its auspicious growth began, "opened a way for the
rightless captive of Rome's arms to reach every privilege granted
the citizen and, in the end, to bear no small part in ameliorating
the general lot of mankind.
We proceed, then, to enquire under what juristic conditions
persons of free condition became slaves; in what manner the slave
might lawfully gain freedom; and, lastly, what was the nature of
the status which such freedom could bestow.
In earliest Rome the resident population exhibits a threefold
division-patricii, clientes, servi. Of these the patrician alone is
ingenuus-free born; the jus civile recognizes him as being sprung
from parents united in lawful wedlock, and he can, therefore, in
a sense denied to the client and the slave, claim his ancestors as
patres. 10 The client is the fugitive-immigrant or the vanquished
native seeking protection from among the patres: applicatio ad pa-
tronum; or he is, again, the domestic bondman no longer the victim
39, Concurring opinions in Dred Scott v. Sandford, i9 How. 393, 476,
seq., where a misapprehension of a text in Justinian's Institutes, precisely as
had been the case during the Missouri debate (December 12, 1820; Ann. 16th
Cong. 2nd Sess. p. 617), and also a consequent misapprehension of Gibbon,
led to an erroneous conclusion.
4o. Dionysius, Antiq., 2, 8, 3.
EMANCIPATION AND CITIZENSHIP.
of personal ownership and utter rightlessness, yet practically a
subject of his former dominus now become patronus. To the in-
genuus belonged jus optimum securing him home-right, family and
tribal relations-civil and sacred, together with eligibility to office:
"optima lege," says Sigonius, 41 "is mihi civis Romanus videtur qui
domicilium, qui tribum, qui honorum potestatem est adeptus." On
the other hand, such participation in these as the client enjoyed
came to him through membership in the patron's familia: "clien-
tes" says Aulus Gellius, 42 are they "qui sese itidem in fidem patro-
ciniumque nostrum dediderunt." The slave-servus-is the free
man made prize of formal war 43-- bellum justum, or sentenced
for crime to be sold; 41 until delivered through manumission, the
descendants of an enslaved mother shared her fate. When a be-
sieged town surrendered at discretion to the Roman commander,
its inhabitants preserved freedom, indeed, yet with such measure
only of public and private right as Rome might grant: "dediticii ves-
trii passuri," says the Capuan ambassadors 4 5 to the Senate, 343 B.
C., but, if taken by storm, all-land, movables, people-belonged to
the conqueror as merchandise, and the inhabitants were sold: "manci-
pia 46 jure belli capta coronis induta veniebant." So, in *the case of
Veii; "caede hostium ac direptione urbis opulentissimae est consump-
tus; postero die libera corpora dictator sub corona vendidit." 47
Therefore it is that we find Dionysius remarking with no little pride
that the Roman slave was obtained in a manner formally justified
and honest: at r c3 Ops-'a7p yrconxr/o'az5' ms r' ro35" 6zx'azord-
rov yZ 6,oYavz Ppo7roV5. 48
Stealing by a slave-trader of men savage or civilized could never
form the basis of slave-title in Roman law: a piratis aut latrocini-
bus capti, liberi permanent. 49 It was the public enemy, seized as
a trespasser 5 0 on Roman soil or overcome in battle, who became
41. Ap. Rosin. Antiq. Roman i, x5.
42. Noct. Attic. 5, 13.
43. Inst. Justin. 1, 3, 4.
44. Dionys. Ibid. 4, 15; Heinecc. Antiq. Roman. Syntagma. p. xSo.
45. Liv. 7, 33. 4-
46. Noct. Attic. 6, 4, 3.
47. Liv. 22, 1. 17 (B.C. 396).
48. Dionys. 4, 24, 2.
49. Digest, 49, x5, 19, 2.
So. Dig. 49, 15, 5, 2.
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Rome's property and not that of an individual until purchased from
the state: "ea, quae ex hostibus capimus jure gentium statim nostra
fiunt; 51 adeo quidem ut et liberi homines in servitutem nostram
deducantur," etc., is the ancient rule still valid in Justinian's day.
Such, then, was the Roman slave in his origin and in the earlier
stage of release as client. At a period, however, long antedating au-
thentic history, the client has emerged into citizen-status although
gaining, at the outset of this new era, but a limited exercise of citi-
zen-right; he is thereafter a "libertinus civis," 52 one of the citizens
"qui servitutem servissent," and whose tribal and centuriate place, as
a freedman, amid the Plebs is destined to exhibit sharp variations
toward the Republic's declining years. Laying out of view all such
details in the history of freedmen's status as quite outside our
present purpose, we proceed to a consideration of manumission
itself and its legal effect. Through reduction to slavery a human
being becomes a Roman chattel; it was, accordingly, by Roman law,
here giving effect to "jus gentium" that such a chattel's condition
might be changed. Hence manumission is the act of a citizen under
the sanction of the public will, this latter element of the trans-
action being invoked through: (x) the process known
as Vindicta 53  carried out before a praetor (who repre-
sented the state) and consisting in an open release of claim on
the owner's part; (2) registration on the census-roll of citizens"
by the owner or with his assent, the censor here representing
Rome; (3) the gift of freedom by testamentary 5" disposition, the
Roman testament having, in early days, been witnessed by the as-
sembled people "iisdem comitiis quae calata appellati diximus," says
Gellius, "et sacrorum detestatio et testamenta" fieri solebant;" in-
deed the modern witnesses to a will are but an image of the primi-
tive ceremony. From having been a Roman chattel, the slave, with a
51. Inst. 2, I, 17.
52. Liv. 41, 8, io; address of the Samnite ambassadors, 177 B. C.; cf.
Liv. 40, 13, 7.
53. "Qui vindicabat," days Gains (4, 16), "festucam tenebat; deinde
ipsam rem adprehendebat, veluti hominem, et ita dicebat; hunc ego homi-
nem ex jure Quiritium meum esse aio secundum suam causam, sicut dixi; ecce
tibi, vindictam (the rod-festuca) inposui, et simul homini festucam inponebat."
Cf. Gellius, 20, 10, 8; the war captive being a chattel (Grotius, De Jur. Bell.
et Pac. 3, 6, 3, 2) was delivered to freedom as such.
54. Gains, r, 17; Ulp. 1, 8.
55. Gains, 2, 267.
56. Noct. Attic. 15, 27, 3.
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disappearance of the force-manus-whose imposition deprived him
of legal rights, wai now free and moreover, Roman; hence he was a
citizen whose status sprang out of a recognition of his enfranchise-
ment by the "jus civile"--the citizen's law 57 whose prescription must
be rigidly followed. So Cicero writes: "neque censu, neque vindic-
ta, nec testamento liber factus est, non est liber."58 Yet once free
in lawful form, the bondman became civis: "libertate, id est civi-
tate."5 9 The civitas thus acquired though limited in range, was yet
clothed with the private rights of citizenship; these were, of course,
of far greater value than the public rights which comprised eligi-
bility to office-jus honorum, 60 etc. The freedman was one of the
Quirites: "una Quiritem vertigo facit," cries Persius 61 of the stable
boy become a Roman with a turn (vertigo) given him in the vindic-
ta proceeding and signifying that the world now lay open to him,
the vindicta being the rod-ancient symbol of dominion-and here
employed in a light touch upon the slave's head: "liber esto" says
the master, "atque abito quo voles." Under Augustu3 and Tiberius
several restrictions were laid upon manumission: (i) the lex Ae-
lia Sentia (4 A. D.) assigned freedmen, who, as slaves, had been
guilty of criminality, to no higher rank than could be reached by a
surrendered enemy-dediticius; furthermore, were a slave less than
thirty years of age or his manumitter under twenty, the vindicta
process must be employed, and the approbation of a consilium ob-
tained: "nam ea lex minores .. . annorum servos non aliter vol-
uit manumissos cives Romanos fieri, quam si vindicta, apud consili-
um, justa causa manumissionis adprobata, liberati fuerint." 62 Some
57. "Who," says Cicero, "that is free under ' jus Quiritium' is not of the
'Quirites?"' (",Qui enim potest jure Quiritium liber esse is, qui in numero
Quiritium non est? ') Pro Cmecina, 33, 96.
58. Cie. Topic, 2, 10.
59. Cic. Pro Balbo, 9, 24.
69. Regarded as the possessor of the private rights of a citizen the
Roman was specially one of the Quirites; whereas the jus civitatis (under
the republic, at least, looked to rights public in character; the private rights
were: Ijus libertatis,jus gentilitatis et familiae,jus connubii" (this last the freed-
men had among those of their own condition, but not, at the first, with ingenui),
"jus dominii legitimi, jus testamenti et hereditatis, jus tutelae;" the public
rights: "jus honorum, jus census, jus militiae, jus trihutorum, jus suffragii
jus sacrorum." The freedmen, and those of the "municipal" towns who l4ad
become Roman citizens, possessed some, but not all,of these public rights, and
in varying degrees.
61. Sat. 5, 75-76.
62. Gaius, x, 18.
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four years later the lex Fufia Caninia 63 forbade the freeing of
more than a fixed proportion of one's slaves, or of more than one
hundred in any event, by testament. In the year 19 A. D. a supple-
mentary enactment- lev Junia Norbana, 6--declared thos at-
tempted to be set free without observance of the Aelian Sentian regu-
lations should be placed in a class similar to that occupied by colo-
nials having Latin rank: "latini Juniana appellantur; latini ideo
quia adsimulati sunt latinis coloniariis; Juniana ideo, quia per leg-
em Juniam libertatem acceperunt. cum olim servi viderentur esse.
. .. Latini vero multis modis ad civitatern Romanam perveniunt."
Thus, hereafter the law recognizes three classes of freedmen: Ro-
man citizens, Latins, dediticii; these latter being excluded from
residence at or near Rome itself and being without capacity of
reaching citizenship. Such signal disabilities, however, arose from
crime committed while yet in a slave condition; it was reserved for
American statesmen and judges nineteen centuries later to ascribe
similar brands of exclusion and non-citizenship to a freedman be-
cause he or his ancestors, being wholly inoffensive, had been stolen
away by a cowardly slave-trader and sold as a bondman without
color of even a barbarous right of conquest.
We are now in a position to appreciate the reforms touching
citizenship instituted by Justinian. The emperor found, he tells us, 68
the three classes of freedmen still existing in his day, though the de-
diticius had become practically an obsolete factor ("in desuetudinem
abiit"), nor was the class of Latini very much in evidence. These
two divisions were, accordingly, done away and thus freedmen's
position once more made what it had been when Augustus intro-
duced the modifications above noticed, and as tradition also repre-
sented it to have been at the beginnings of Republican Rome: "a
primis urbis Roma cunabulis." Such social or civil inferiority, too,
as the freedman might be subject to, was annihilated in attaching
to manumission henceforth a right to wear the gold ring together
with the noble jus regenerationis, -o roa zyyevora; 46i'mazo, the
63. Gains, z, 42.
64. Gai. 1, 22-28. Prior to the imperial regulations, a slave freed by a
master holding him ex jure Quirilum (and not in bonis merely), and employ-
ing the formal methods noted, became a civis; lacking this formality he might
be protected by the fpraetor, indeed, in liberty, but remained outside citizen
ranks: "ox Servi Tullii instituto," says Huberus (Praeectiones, 1, p. 22),
- manumissi omnes plena libertate et eodem jure quo vetusti cives fomebantur,
licet dignitate inferiores. Sed Augustus libertinos curlose discrevit, prop ut
olim cives Romani differebant."
65. Inst. X, 5, 3.
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birthright regained,natalium restitutio, 6 6 through which the slave,
raised to a plane decreed all men by jus naturale, witnessed in his
own person sure triumph at the last of a law unconfined by space
or time.
Nor was the spirit of Roman jurisprudence to pave a way to-
ward civil manhood for Rome's slaves only. Even the night of the
Dark Ages recognized a bondman enfranchised pursuant to solemn
public regulation as a member of his state in the highest sense and
the equal of all. That such an example played no small part in
the destruction of slavery itself and the advent of modern civili-
zation may be well believed; were other proof lacking, the whole-
some fear shown by American slaveholders in the nineteenth cen-
tury lest freedmen become citizen-members of their own common-
wealths would sufficiently attest a fact which will hereafter be
found weighed in the -even balance of history with accusing prec-
edents from both Pagan and Christian Rome.
Gordon E. Sherman.
66. Marcian in the digest, 4o, 1i1; Nov. Justin, 78. 1-2.
The subject is easily capable of a far more extended illustration than can
be given in these notes already unduly expanded. Mention should be made,
however, of Pliny who, in his letters has left us many graphic notices of
citizenship acquired through manumission: he writes to his wife's kinsman
Fabatus (Ep. Lib. 7, x6 and 32), Suggesting that Calestrius Tiro wil soon pass
through Fabatus' place of residence-Ticinum (Pavia)-on his way to Baetica
(Andalusia) as proconsul and can, therefore, as magistrate, confer, through
vindicta, citizen-freedom on some libertini whom Fabatus had lately manu-
mitted by informal declaration "inter amicos." Pliny adds later, the process
having taken place, that he rejoices in such an addition to Rome's citizens,
much as we remember Dr. Rush reminding the Continental Congress that
through the disappearance of slavery by increased manumission, the ranks of
American citizenship would be augmented.
Manumission under Roman law has received little attention in American
iterature; an able sketch appeared in the pages of Bibliotheca Sacra for
August, 1845, and another, by President Woolsey, of Yale College, in the New
Englander for August, 1857, with special reference to the misapprehensions
exhibited in Dred Scott's case: Mr. Justice Appleton, too, gives a clear,
though brief, mention in his opinion already referred to-44 Maine, App. pp.,
526-527. The ablest recent presentation is that of Voigt, in the Transactions
of the Royal Society of Saxony for 1878, ("Berichte Uiber die Verhandlungen
der Kbniglich Sgchsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig."
Philologisch-Hislorische Classe, July 24, 1878).
